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Tribunal cannot frame its own recruitment rules

  • Writer: M.R Mishra
    M.R Mishra
  • 4 days ago
  • 3 min read

The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Rama Rao & Ors v. M.G. Maheshwara Rao & Ors (27 August 2007) is a significant reaffirmation of a foundational principle of service jurisprudence: courts and tribunals may test the validity of rules, but they cannot step into the shoes of the rule-making authority and reframe them.


What's The Matter?


The dispute arose from promotions within the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal establishment.


The Government had framed Recruitment Rules prescribing specific qualifications including a degree and qualifying test for promotion to the post of Junior Judgment Writer. Stenographers challenged these qualifications before the Administrative Tribunal, contending that the requirements were unreasonable.


The Tribunal not only struck down the prescribed qualifications but went further it effectively substituted them with qualifications of its own design.


Acting upon this judicial order, promotions were granted accordingly.


This triggered a second round of litigation.


Assistants, belonging to another feeder cadre affected by the promotional structure, challenged both the Tribunal’s earlier decision and the consequential promotions.


The High Court partly allowed their writ petition, holding that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to rewrite the Rules.


However, it set aside only the promotions of non-graduate stenographers, allowing graduate stenographers to retain their promotions.


Both sides appealed.


What Court Said?


Before the Supreme Court, two critical issues emerged.


First, whether the Assistants had locus standi to challenge the earlier Tribunal decision to which they were not parties.


Second, whether the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in altering the Recruitment Rules.


On the question of locus standi, the Court relied upon its earlier ruling in K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, clarifying that persons adversely affected by a prior order even if not impleaded could approach the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.


An order that impacts service prospects cannot become immune merely because affected parties were absent in earlier proceedings.


The Assistants, therefore, were justified in seeking reconsideration.The more substantial holding, however, concerns the limits of adjudicatory power.


The Supreme Court unequivocally affirmed that the Administrative Tribunal had acted beyond its jurisdiction.


Even assuming a rule to be unreasonable, the proper course is to strike it down not to legislate afresh. By prescribing alternative qualifications and then implementing them administratively, the Tribunal blurred the separation between adjudication and rule-making.


The Court observed that “a thing that is to be done has not only to be done properly but also appear to be done properly,” subtly criticizing the Vice-Chairman who both quashed the rule judicially and implemented promotions administratively.


Once the foundational order of 6 July 1994 was held unsustainable, all promotions based on it became legally infirm.


The Supreme Court found fault with the High Court’s partial approach. If the very basis of promotion was illegal, the logical consequence was to set aside all promotions not merely those of non-graduates.


Accordingly, the Court dismissed the stenographers’ appeals and allowed the assistants’ appeals, directing a fresh exercise of promotions strictly in accordance with the valid Recruitment Rules.


Importantly, the Court balanced legality with equity. While cancelling the promotions, it directed that no recovery of salary or allowances be made from those who had worked in the promotional posts.


This reflects a consistent judicial approach in service law rectifying institutional illegality without imposing disproportionate hardship on employees who acted in good faith.

Disclaimer: This content is published strictly for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it be relied upon as a substitute for professional legal counsel.


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Case Details:

Diary No. 16637/2002 | C.A. Nos. 7474–7477 of 2003 | Rama Rao & Ors v. M.G. Maheshwara Rao & Ors | Advocate: Naveen R. Nath | Bench: H.K. Sema & P.K. Balasubramanyan | Judgment by P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. | Decided on 27-08-2007

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