The Right to Walk on Footpaths is a Fundamental Right

Ohe Supreme Court of India delivered a remarkable judgment in Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan (2026 INSC 647), transforming what began as a motor accident compensation appeal into a constitutional declaration of far-reaching significance.

In doing so, the Court recognized the "Right to Walk" as a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution and held that this right necessarily includes access to safe, demarcated, and well-maintained footpaths.

What's The Matter?

The case arose from a tragic incident involving a five-year-old child who was fatally struck by a tanker while walking with his father to school.

The Court noted that there was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing at the site of the accident. What might ordinarily have remained a dispute over compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act became an opportunity for the Court to confront a deeper structural problem: the systematic neglect of pedestrians in India's transportation and urban planning framework.

What's Court Said?

Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, writing for the Bench, observed that India has increasingly organized its roads and cities around motorized transport while relegating pedestrians to the margins.

According to the Court, this imbalance has obscured a basic constitutional reality. Before citizens move on wheels, they move on foot.

Consequently, the primary expression of the freedom of movement guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) is the right to walk.

The judgment emphatically rejects the assumption that the constitutional freedom of movement is primarily concerned with vehicular mobility.

Instead, it declares that the right to walk is inherent in Article 19(1)(d), read alongside Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), and Article 21.

Walking, the Court reasoned, is not merely a mode of transportation but also an expression of personal liberty, association, assembly, culture, religion, and political participation.

Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the judgment is its recognition of a corresponding public duty.

The Court held that wherever a road exists, there is a legal obligation upon urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities, and panchayats to provide and maintain demarcated footpaths. This duty is not aspirational. It is enforceable.

While the legislation contains provisions regulating drivers, licensing, registration, insurance, and claims, it does not recognize or protect the right to walk. Pedestrian interests, according to the Court, remain merely incidental within a statutory structure designed primarily around vehicles.

The Court drew comparisons with legislative frameworks that operationalize other fundamental rights.

Just as Parliament enacted laws to implement the Right to Education and the Right to Information, the Court suggested that a dedicated statutory framework is necessary to secure the right to walk.

Such legislation, according to the judgment, should identify duty-bearers, establish remedies, and create an independent regulatory body responsible for planning, monitoring, and enforcing pedestrian rights.

To that end, the Court directed that copies of the judgment be forwarded to the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways, as well as the Law Commission of India, for consideration of an appropriate legislative framework.

Another notable feature of the ruling is its recognition of independent remedies. The Court clarified that violations of the right to walk may give rise to constitutional and restitutionary claims against public authorities.

These remedies exist separately from compensation claims under the Motor Vehicles Act. In other words, a victim or affected citizen may seek accountability not only from negligent drivers but also from authorities that failed to provide pedestrian infrastructure.

The judgment ultimately restored and enhanced compensation payable to the child's family, awarding ₹11.44 lakh. Yet the compensation issue became secondary to the broader constitutional principles articulated by the Court.

The significance of this decision extends far beyond a single accident. Indian cities have long prioritized vehicular speed over pedestrian safety. Encroached footpaths, missing sidewalks, unsafe crossings, and inaccessible public spaces have become commonplace.

By declaring the right to walk a fundamental right, the Supreme Court has shifted the legal conversation from convenience to constitutional entitlement.

Whether this landmark declaration translates into tangible improvements on the ground will depend on legislative action and administrative implementation.

Nevertheless, the Court has laid down an important constitutional marker. For the first time, the right to walk safely on a footpath is no longer a matter of policy preference or urban planning discretion. It is a fundamental right enforceable against the State.

In a country where millions still depend on walking as their primary mode of mobility, the judgment represents a long-overdue recognition that roads belong not only to vehicles but also to people.

The constitutional promise of freedom of movement begins not with the automobile, but with the pedestrian.